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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the multi-server setting of Private Information Retrieval with Private Coded Side
Information (PIR-PCSI) problem. In this problem, there is a database of K messages whose copies are replicated
across N servers, and there is a user who knows a random linear combination of a random subset of M messages
in the database as side information. The user wishes to download one message from the servers, while protecting
the identities of both the demand message and the messages forming the side information. We assume that the
servers know the number of messages forming the user’s side information in advance, whereas the indices of
these messages and their coefficients in the side information are not known to any of the servers a priori.
Our goal is to characterize (or derive a lower bound on) the capacity, i.e., the maximum achievable download
rate, for the following two settings. In the first setting, the set of messages forming the linear combination available
to the user as side information, does not include the user’s demanded message. For this setting, we show that the
capacity is equal to
(
1 + 1/N + · · ·+ 1/NK−M−1
)
−1
. In the second setting, the demand message contributes
to the linear combination available to the user as side information, i.e., the demand message is one of the
messages that form the user’s side information. For this setting, we show that the capacity is lower-bounded by
(
1 + 1/N + · · ·+ 1/NK−M
)
−1
. The proposed achievability schemes and proof techniques leverage ideas from
both our recent methods proposed for the single-server PIR-PCSI problem as well as the techniques proposed
by Sun and Jafar for multi-server private computation problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Private Information Retrieval (PIR) problem, a database of K messages are replicated at N servers.
There is a user who wishes to retrieve a single or multiple messages belonging to the database while protecting
the identity of the demanded message(s) from any individual server [1]–[4]. In order to retrieve the desired
message(s), the user generates one query for each server. Upon receiving the user’s query, each server will
return an answer to the user, which depends on the stored messages and the received query. To ensure that
each server learns nothing about the identity of the message(s) being retrieved by the user, in an information
theoretic sense, each query must be marginally independent of the desired message(s) index.
In a single-server setting or a multi-server setting when all servers can fully collude, the user must download
the whole database to achieve privacy in the information-theoretic sense [1]. However, when the user has some
side information about the messages in the database [5]–[18] or when the servers do not fully collude [2]–[4],
the privacy can be achieved in a more efficient manner in terms of minimizing the download cost (i.e., the
amount of information downloaded from the server(s)).
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For the PIR problem in the presence of side information, two different types of privacy can be considered:
(i) W -privacy, which requires that the identity of the user’s demanded message(s) be protected, and (ii) (W,S)-
privacy, which requires that the identities of both the user’s demanded message(s) and the message(s) in the
user’s side information be protected. When the side information is a random subset of messages, the problem
is referred to as PIR with Side Information (PIR-SI) or PIR with Private Side Information (PIR-PSI) where
W -privacy or (W,S)-privacy is required, respectively. The single-server settings of these problems were studied
in [5]–[7], and their multi-server settings were studied in [8]–[10]. In [11] and [12], we studied the single-server
setting of a related problem in which the side information is a random linear combination of a random subset
of messages. This problem is referred to as PIR with Coded Side Information (PIR-CSI) or PIR with Private
Coded Side Information (PIR-PCSI) when W -privacy or (W,S)-privacy is required, respectively. Also, in [13],
we recently studied the multi-server setting of the PIR-CSI problem.
In this work, we consider the multi-server setting of the PIR-PCSI problem. In this setting, a database of
K messages is replicated across N servers, and a user, who knows a random linear combination of a random
subset ofM messages in the database, wishes to obtain a message by sending queries to the servers. The goal is
to design a scheme that protects the identities of both the user’s demanded message and the messages forming
the user’s side information, while minimizes the download cost. The servers are assumed to know the number
of messages contributing to the user’s side information beforehand. However, the indices and the coefficients
of the messages in the user’s side information are not known to the servers in advance. The motivation for
this type of side information comes from several practical scenarios. For instance, the side information could
have been obtained in advance from a trusted server with limited knowledge about the database, or through
overhearing in a wireless network, or from the information locally stored in the user’s cache.
A. Main Contributions
We consider two settings of the PIR-PCSI problem depending on whether the user’s demanded message is
one of the messages forming the user’s side information or not. We characterize (or derive a lower bound on)
the capacity of each setting, where the capacity is defined as the supremum of all achievable rates (i.e., the
inverse of the normalized download cost). In the first setting, the message demanded by the user is not one
of the messages forming the user’s side information. For this setting, we prove that the capacity is equal to(
1 + 1/N + · · ·+ 1/NK−M−1
)−1
. Interestingly, the capacity in this setting is equal to the capacity of multi-
server PIR-PSI problem [8] in which M uncoded messages are available at the user as side information. This
result shows that there is no loss in capacity due to restricting the user’s side information to one random linear
combination of M messages, instead of M uncoded messages.
The converse proof readily follows from the fact that the capacity of this setting is upper-bounded by the
capacity of the multi-server PIR-PSI which is given by
(
1 + 1/N + · · ·+ 1/NK−M−1
)−1
(see [8, Theorem 1]).
For the achievability proof, we devise a new protocol that builds upon two existing achievability schemes for
two different problems: (i) the Private Computation (PC) scheme of [19] for multi-server private computation
where a user wishes to privately retrieve one arbitrary linear combination of the messages replicated at multiple
servers, and (ii) our Specialized GRS Code scheme proposed in [12] for single-server PIR-PCSI.
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The main ideas of our achievability scheme are as follows. First, the user utilizes the Specialized GRS Code
scheme of [12] for single-server PIR-PCSI to construct K −M independent super-messages which are some
linearly independent combinations of the original messages, to play the role of the original messages in a
multi-server private computation problem. Then, the user and the N servers leverage the PC scheme of [19]
for the constructed K −M super-messages in such a way that the user can privately download one of
(
K
M+1
)
linear combinations of the K −M super-messages where the support of each linear combination is a distinct
subset of [K] of size M + 1.
Additionally, for the setting wherein the demanded message is one of the messages forming the user’s side
information, we show that the capacity is lower-bounded by
(
1 + 1/N + · · ·+ 1/NK−M
)−1
. The proof is
based on a new achievability scheme that leverages the PC scheme of [19] for multi-server private computation,
combined with our Modified Specialized GRS Code scheme proposed in [12] for single-server PIR-PCSI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We denote random variables by bold letters and their realizations by non-bold letters. For a positive integer
i, let [i] , {1, . . . , i}. Let Fq be a finite field for some prime q, and let F
×
q , Fq \ {0} be the multiplicative
group of Fq. Let Fqm be an extension field of Fq for some integer m ≥ 1.
Consider N non-colluding identical servers, each of which stores K messages X1, . . . , XK , where Xi is
independently and uniformly distributed over Fqm , i.e., for all i ∈ [K], it holds that
H(Xi) = L , m log2 q, and H(X1, . . . ,XK) = KL.
Suppose that there is a user that wishes to retrieve a messageXW from the servers for someW ∈ [K], and has
a linear combination Y [S,C] ,
∑
i∈S ciXi for some S , {i1, . . . , iM} ∈ S and some C , {ci1 , . . . , ciM } ∈ C,
where S is the set of all M -subsets of [K], and C is the set of all length-M sequences with elements from F×q .
We call W the demand index, XW the demand, Y
[S,C] the side information, S the side information index set,
and M the side information size.
We assume that S is uniformly distributed over S, and that C is uniformly distributed over C. Also, two
different models for the conditional distribution of W given S = S are considered:
• Model I: W is uniformly distributed over [K] \ S;
• Model II: W is uniformly distributed over S.
It is assumed that 1 ≤ M ≤ K − 1 and 2 ≤ M ≤ K for Model I and Model II, respectively. Note that for
both models it holds that W is uniformly distributed over [K]. We assume that no server knows the realizations
of S,C,W in advance. In contrast, we assume that all servers know the considered model (i.e., whether W 6∈ S
or W ∈ S), the side information size M , the distributions of S and C, and the conditional distribution of W
given S.
For any S, C, W , in order to retrieve XW , the user generates N queries Q
[W,S,C]
1 , . . . , Q
[W,S,C]
N , and sends
to the n-th server the query Q
[W,S,C]
n . Each query Q
[W,S,C]
n is assumed to be a (potentially stochastic) function
of W , S, C, and Y [S,C]. Upon receiving the query Q
[W,S,C]
n , the n-th server responds to the user with an
answer A
[W,S,C]
n . The answer A
[W,S,C]
n is a (deterministic) function of the query Q
[W,S,C]
n and the messages in
X[K] , {X1, . . . , XK}. Note that for all n ∈ [N ], it holds that
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(W,S) → (Q[W,S,C]n ,X[K])→ A
[W,S,C]
n
forms a Markov chain, and
H(A[W,S,C]n |Q
[W,S,C]
n ,X[K]) = 0.
The answers A
[W,S,C]
1 , . . . , A
[W,S,C]
N from all servers along with the side information Y
[S,C] and the queries
Q
[W,S,C]
1 , . . . , Q
[W,S,C]
N must enable the user to retrieve the demand XW , i.e.,
H(XW|A
[W,S,C],Q[W,S,C],Y[S,C],W,S,C) = 0,
where A[W,S,C] , {A
[W,S,C]
1 , . . . , A
[W,S,C]
N }, and Q
[W,S,C] , {Q
[W,S,C]
1 , . . . , Q
[W,S,C]
N }. This condition is
referred to as the recoverability condition.
In addition, the queries Q
[W,S,C]
1 , . . . , Q
[W,S,C]
N must not reveal any information about the user’s demand
index W and side information index set S to any server,
I(W,S;Q[W,S,C]n ,A
[W,S,C]
n ,X[K]) = 0 ∀n ∈ [N ].
This condition is referred to as the (W,S)-privacy condition.
For both models (Model I and Model II), we would like to design a protocol for generating queries
{Q
[W,S,C]
1 , . . . , Q
[W,S,C]
N } for any given W,S,C. The protocol also prescribes, for all n ∈ [N ], how the n-
th server generates the answer A
[W,S,C]
n , given Q
[W,S,C]
n and X[K].
A protocol that satisfies both the (W,S)-privacy and recoverability conditions for all W,S,C with W 6∈ S
(or W ∈ S), is referred to as a PIR-PCSI–I (or PIR-PCSI–II) protocol. The problem of designing a PIR-PCSI–I
(or PIR-PCSI–II) protocol is referred to as the PIR-PCSI–I (or PIR-PCSI–II) problem.
The rate of a PIR-PCSI–I or PIR-PCSI–II protocol is defined as the ratio of the entropy of a message, i.e.,
L, to the total entropy of answers from all servers, i.e., H(A[W,S,C]).
The capacity of the PIR-PCSI–I (PIR-PCSI–II) problem is defined as the supremum of rates over all PIR-
PCSI–I (PIR-PCSI–II) protocols. We denote by C(W,S)−I the capacity of the PIR-PCSI–I problem, and denote
by C(W,S)−II the capacity of the PIR-PCSI–II problem.
In this work, our goal is to characterize (or derive lower bounds on) C(W,S)−I and C(W,S)−II, and to design
PIR-PCSI–I and PIR-PCSI–II protocols that achieve the capacity (or the derived lower bound on the capacity).
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present our main results. Theorem 1 characterizes the capacity of the PIR-PCSI–I problem
C(W,S)−I, and Theorem 2 presents a lower-bound on the capacity of the PIR-PCSI–II problem C(W,S)−II. The
proofs of theorems 1 and 2 are given in sections IV and V, respectively.
Theorem 1. The capacity of the PIR-PCSI–I problem with N servers, K messages, and side information size
1 ≤M ≤ K − 1 is given by
C(W,S)−I =
(
1 +
1
N
+ · · ·+
1
NK−M−1
)−1
.
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Interestingly, this result indicates that the capacity of multi-server PIR-PCSI–I, i.e., C(W,S)−I, is equal to
the capacity of the multi-server PIR-PSI [8] where M uncoded messages are available at the user as side
information. Note that having only a random linear combination of M messages as side information instead of
M uncoded messages, cannot increase the capacity which implies the converse. Thus, to complete the proof
of Theorem 1, we only need to prove the achievability which is presented in Section IV. Notably, our results
show that having only one random linear combination of messages instead of multiple uncoded messages does
not decrease the capacity, either.
Theorem 2. The capacity of the PIR-PCSI–II problem with N servers, K messages, and side information size
2 ≤M ≤ K is lower-bounded by
C(W,S)−II ≥
(
1 +
1
N
+ · · ·+
1
NK−M
)−1
.
This result is interesting because it shows that the lower-bound on the capacity of the multi-server PIR-
PCSI–II is the same as the capacity of multi-server PIR-SI when the size of side information is M − 1. That is,
having a side information which is only a random linear combination of M messages including the demanded
message would be at least as effective as knowing M − 1 messages separately in terms of minimizing the
download cost. For the proof, we construct a PIR-PCSI–II protocol that achieves the capacity lower-bound of
Theorem 2. It should be noted that the tightness of this lower bound remains open in general.
IV. THE PIR-PCSI-I PROBLEM
In this section, we complete the proof of Theorem 1 by proposing an achievability scheme for arbitrary N ,
K ≥ 1 and 0 ≤M ≤ K − 1 that achieves the rate
(
1 + 1/N + · · ·+ 1/NK−M−1
)−1
. The proposed protocol,
referred to as the Multi-Server PIR-PCSI–I protocol, is a non-trivial combination of the Specialized GRS Code
scheme of [12] for single-server PIR-PCSI problem and the Private Computation (PC) scheme of [19] for
multi-server private computation problem.
For the proposed protocol, we assume that q ≥ K , and each message Xi consists of m = N
( KM+1) symbols
over Fq.
Multi-Server PIR-PCSI–I protocol: The protocol consists of the following five steps:
Step 1: The user utilizes the Specialized GRS Code protocol proposed in [12] to first construct a polynomial
p(x) =
∑K−M−1
i=0 pix
i ,
∏
i6∈S∪W (x − ωi) where ω1, . . . , ωK are K arbitrarily chosen distinct elements from
Fq, and then construct r , K−M vectors u1, . . . , ur, each of length K , such that ui = [β1ω
i−1
1 , . . . , βKω
i−1
K ]
for i ∈ [r], where βj =
cj
p(ωj)
for j ∈ S, and βj is a randomly chosen element from F
×
q for j 6∈ S.
Step 2: Let Xˆi ,
∑K
j=1 βjω
i−1
j Xj for i ∈ [r]. Each Xˆi is referred to as a super-message. Note that the vector
ui (constructed in Step 1) is the vector of coefficients of the messages {Xi}i∈[K] in the super-message Xˆi. Let
F ,
(
K
M+1
)
, and let J1, J2, . . . , JF be the collection of all (M + 1)-subsets of [K] in a lexicographical order.
The structure of the Specialized GRS Code protocol [12] ensures that for each Jf , f ∈ [F ], there exist exactly
q − 1 linear combinations Z1f , Z
2
f , . . . , Z
q−1
f of the messages {Xi}i∈Jf with (non-zero) coefficients from F
×
q ,
such that for every k ∈ [q − 1], Zkf can be written as a linear combination of the super-messages Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆr.
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Let vkf , [v
k
f,1, . . . , v
k
f,r] be a vector of length r such that Z
k
f =
∑r
i=1 v
k
f,iXˆi. Note that, for each f ∈ [F ],
Z1f , Z
2
f , . . . , Z
q−1
f are the same up to a scalar multiple, i.e., for each k ∈ [q − 1], Z
k
f = αkZ
1
f , or equivalently,
vkf = αkv
1
f , for some distinct αk ∈ F
×
q . For each f ∈ [F ], let if , min(Jf ). Note also that for every f ∈ [F ],
there exists a unique kf ∈ [q − 1] such that the coefficient of the message Xif in the linear combination Z
kf
f
is equal to 1. The user then constructs F vectors v1, . . . , vF , each of length r, such that vf = v
kf
f . (Note that
the above procedure dictates a specific choice of the coefficient vectors vf . However, for each f ∈ [F ], the
vector vf can be chosen arbitrarily from the set of vectors {v
k
f}k∈[q−1].) Let Zf , Z
kf
f for f ∈ [F ]. Each Zf
is referred to as a (linear) function. Note that vf is the vector of coefficients of the super-messages {Xˆi}i∈[r]
in the function Zf .
Step 3: The user sends to all servers the vectors u1, . . . , ur (associated with the super-messages Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆr),
and the vectors v1, . . . , vF (associated with the functions Z1, . . . , ZF ). It is noteworthy that the user needs only
to send the vectors {ui}i∈[r] to all servers, and each server can construct the vectors {vf}f∈[F ] by using
{ui}i∈[r] (according to the procedure described in Step 2).
Step 4: The user and the servers leverage the PC scheme of [19] with r (independent) messages and F (linear)
functions of these messages in order for the user to privately retrieve one of these functions. In particular, the
r = K −M super-messages {Xˆi}i∈[r] and the F functions {Zf}f∈[F ] play the role of the original messages
and the functions in the PC scheme, respectively, and the user is interested in retrieving the function Zf∗
privately, where Zf∗ is an F
×
q -linear combination (i.e., a linear combination with non-zero coefficients only) of
the messages {Xi}i∈W∪S . (By the construction, there exists one (and only one) function Zf among Z1, . . . , ZF
such that Zf is an F
×
q -linear combination of the messages {Xi}i∈W∪S .) To be more specific, each server first
constructs the super-messages {Xˆi}i∈[r] by using the coefficient vectors {ui}i∈[r] (defined in Step 3), and then
constructs the functions {Zf}f∈[F ] by using the super-messages {Xˆi}i∈[r] and the coefficient vectors {vf}f∈[F ]
(defined in Step 3). Note that each function Zf for f ∈ [F ] consists of m = N
F
Fq-symbols where N is the
number of servers. Then, each server sends to the user m(1/N + 1/N2 + · · ·+ 1/NK−M ) carefully designed
linear combinations of all Fq-symbols associated with all functions {Zf}f∈[F ]. The details of the design of the
user’s query to each server as well as the linear combinations transmitted by each server (which also depend
on the query of the user) can be found in [19, Section 4].
Example 1. (Multi-Server PIR-PCSI–I protocol) Assume that there are N = 2 servers, K = 4 messages
from F516 , and M = 2. Note that each message consists of m = N
( KM+1) = 16 symbols from F5. Suppose that
the user demands the message X1 and has a coded side information Y = X2 +X3, i.e., W = 1, S = {2, 3},
and C = {1, 1} (i.e., c2 = 1, c3 = 1).
First, the user picksK = 4 distinct elements ω1, . . . , ω4 from F5. Suppose that the user chooses ω1 = 0, ω2 =
1, ω3 = 2, ω4 = 3. Then, the user constructs the polynomial p(x) =
∏
i6∈S∪W (x − ωi) = x− ω4 = x− 3. The
user then computes βj for j ∈ S, i.e., β2 and β3, by setting β2 =
c2
p(ω2)
= 2 and β3 =
c3
p(ω3)
= 4, and chooses
βj for j 6∈ S, i.e., β1 and β4, at random (from F
×
5 ). Assume that the user chooses β1 = 1 and β4 = 2. Then, the
user constructs r = K −M = 2 vectors u1 and u2, each of lengthK = 4, such that ui = [β1ω
i−1
1 , . . . , βKω
i−1
K ]
for i ∈ {1, 2}. That is, the user constructs u1 = [1, 2, 4, 2] and u2 = [0, 2, 3, 1]. For set J1 = {1, 2, 3}, there
exist exactly q − 1 = 4 vectors vk1 = [k, 3k] for k ∈ {1, . . . , 4} such that ku1 + 3ku2 = k[1, 3, 3, 0].
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It should be noted that there exists no other vector v = [v1, v2] such that the support of the vector v1u1 + v2u2
is J1 = {1, 2, 3}. Note that the coefficient of the message Xi1 = X1 (i.e., i1 = min(J1) = 1) in the function Z1
is equal to 1 when k = 1. Thus, the user constructs the vector v1 = v
1
1 = [1, 3]. Similarly, the user constructs
the vectors v2 = [1, 2], v3 = [1, 4] and v4 = [0, 3]. Then, the user sends to all servers the vectors u1 and u2
(associated with the super-messages Xˆ1 and Xˆ2), and the vectors v1, . . . , v4 (associated with the functions
Z1, . . . , Z4). Using the coefficient vectors u1 and u2, each server first constructs the two super-messages
Xˆ1 = X1 + 2X2 + 4X3 + 2X4 and Xˆ2 = 2X2 + 3X3 +X4. Then, it constructs the functions Z1, . . . , Z4 using
the super-messages Xˆ1 and Xˆ2 and the coefficient vectors v1, . . . , v4 as follows:
Z1 = Xˆ1 + 3Xˆ2 = X1 + 3X2 + 3X3
Z2 = Xˆ1 + 2Xˆ2 = X1 +X2 + 4X4
Z3 = Xˆ1 + 4Xˆ2 = X1 +X3 +X4
Z4 = 3Xˆ2 = X2 + 4X3 + 3X4
Finally, the user and the servers apply the PC scheme of [19] for two super-messages Xˆ1, Xˆ2 in order for the
user to privately retrieve the function Z1. (Note that among the functions Z1, . . . , Z4, only Z1 is an F
×
5 -linear
combination of the messages {Xi}i∈W∪S = {X1, X2, X3}.) The details of the PC scheme for this example
are as follows. Let pi : [16]→ [16] be a randomly chosen permutation. Let uf(i) , σiZf (pi(i)) for f ∈ [4] and
i ∈ [16], where Zf(pi(i)) is the pi(i)-th F5-symbol of Zf , and σi is a randomly chosen element from {−1,+1}.
For simplifying the notation, let (ai, bi, ci, di) = (u1(i), u2(i), u3(i), u4(i)) for all i ∈ [16]. The user then
queries 15 carefully designed linear combinations of the symbols {{ai}i∈[16], {bi}i∈[16], {ci}i∈[16], {di}i∈[16]},
as given in Table I [19], from each of the servers (S1 and S2).
As shown in [19], among the 15 symbols queried from S1 (or S2), based on the information obtained
from S2 (or S1), 3 symbols are redundant. For instance, consider the 15 symbols queried from S1. (Similar
observations can be made regarding the queries from S2.) Among the 4 symbols {a1, b1, c1, d1}, any 2
symbols suffice to recover the other 2 symbols. For example, c1 and d1 can be obtained from a1 and b1.
(Note that Z3 and Z4 can be written as a linear combination of Z1 and Z2.) Thus, the server S1 needs
to send two arbitrary symbols from {a1, b1, c1, d1}. In addition, given any 2 symbols from {a2, b2, c2, d2},
any 5 symbols among the 6 symbols {a3 − b2, a4 − c2, a5 − d2, b4 − c3, b5 − d3, c5 − d4} queried from S1
would suffice to recover the remaining symbol. For example, c5 − d4 can be obtained from the symbols {a3−
b2, a4 − c2, a5 − d2, b4 − c3, b5 − d3, b2, d2} (for details, see [19, Section 5.1]). Thus, each of the servers S1 and
S2 needs to send to the user only 12 symbols. In particular, S1 transmits 2 arbitrary symbols from {a1, b1, c1, d1},
5 arbitrary symbols from {a3 − b2, a4 − c2, a5 − d2, b4 − c3, b5 − d3, c5 − d4}, and the 4 symbols {a9 − b7 +
c6, a10−b8+d6, a11−c8+d7, b11−c10+d9}, and the symbol {a15−b14+c13−d12}; and S2 transmits 2 arbitrary
symbols from {a2, b2, c2, d2}, 5 arbitrary symbols from {a6 − b1, a7 − c1, a8 − d1, b7 − c6, b8 − d6, c8 − d7},
and the 4 symbols {a12−b4+c3, a13−b5+d3, a14−c5+d4, b14−c13+d12}, and the symbol {a16−b11+c10−d9}.
From the answers by the servers, the user obtains all 16 symbols a1, . . . , a16, and accordingly, all 16 symbols
of Z1. (Note that ai = u1(i) = σiZ1(pi(i)) for i ∈ [16].) From Z1 (= X1 + 3X2 + 3X3), the user can decode
the desired message X1 by subtracting off the contribution of their side information X2 +X3.
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TABLE I
THE QUERIES OF THE PC PROTOCOL FOR N = 2, 2 SUPER-MESSAGES,F = 4, WHEN THE USER DEMANDS Z1 [19].
S1 S2
a1, b1, c1, d1 a2, b2, c2, d2
a3 − b2 a6 − b1
a4 − c2 a7 − c1
a5 − d2 a8 − d1
b4 − c3 b7 − c6
b5 − d3 b8 − d6
c5 − d4 c8 − d7
a9 − b7 + c6 a12 − b4 + c3
a10 − b8 + d6 a13 − b5 + d3
a11 − c8 + d7 a14 − c5 + d4
b11 − c10 + d9 b14 − c13 + d12
a15 − b14 + c13 − d12 a16 − b11 + c10 − d9
In order to retrieve X1 which consists of 16 symbols (over F5), according to the proposed protocol, the user
downloads 24 symbols (over F5) from both servers, and hence the rate of the proposed protocol is 16/24 = 2/3.
Note that for every 3-subset {Xj1 , Xj2 , Xj3} of the messages {Xi}i∈[4], in the proposed protocol there
exists one (and only one) linear combination Zf for some f ∈ [4] of the messages Xj1 , Xj2 , Xj3 . On the other
hand, the PC scheme guarantees that no server can obtain any information about the index (f ) of the linear
combination Zf being requested by the user. Thus, the proposed scheme satisfies the (W,S)-privacy condition,
as desired.
Lemma 1. The Multi-Server PIR-PCSI–I protocol satisfies the recoverability and (W,S)-privacy conditions, and
achieves the rate C(W,S)−I =
(
1 + 1/N + · · ·+ 1/NK−M−1
)−1
.
Proof: Since the messages X[K] are uniformly and independently distributed over Fqm , and {Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆr}
are linearly independent combinations of the messages in X[K], thus {Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆr} are uniformly and inde-
pendently distributed over Fqm as well, i.e., H(Xˆ1) = · · · = H(Xˆr) = m log q = L. Hence, the rate of the
Multi-Server PIR-PCSI–I protocol is the same as the rate of the PC protocol for N servers and K −M
messages, which is given by
(
1 + 1/N + · · ·+ 1/NK−M−1
)−1
(see [19, Theorem 1]).
From the step 4 of the Multi-Server PIR-PCSI–I protocol, it is evident that the recoverability condition is
satisfied. The proof of the (W,S)-privacy of the proposed protocol is as follows. The PC protocol protects the
privacy of the function (linear combination) requested by the user. That is, given the query, no server can obtain
any information about the index of the function requested by the user. Consider an arbitrary server n ∈ [N ],
and an arbitrary query Qn to server n, generated by the proposed protocol. Thus, given Q
[W,S,C]
n = Qn, from
the perspective of server n, every function Zf for f ∈ [F ] is equally likely to include the demanded message.
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We denote the support of Zf by Zf , i.e., Zf is the set of all indices i ∈ [K] such that Xi has a non-zero
coefficient in the linear combination Zf . Thus, for all f ∈ [F ], we have
Pr(W ∈ Zf |Q
[W,S,C]
n = Qn) =
1(
K
M+1
) , (1)
noting that F =
(
K
M+1
)
. Note that any given index W ′ ∈ [K] is in the support of exactly
(
K−1
M
)
functions Zf ,
f ∈ [F ]. For any given f ∈ [F ], given Q
[W,S,C]
n = Qn and W ∈ Zf , from the perspective of server n, every
index W ′ ∈ Zf is equally likely to be the demand index. That is, for all f ∈ [F ], we have
Pr(W = W ′|Q[W,S,C]n = Qn,W ∈ Zf ) =


1
M+1 , W
′ ∈ Zf ,
0, otherwise.
(2)
Furthermore, for any given f ∈ [F ] and W ′ ∈ Zf , we have
Pr(S = S′|Q[W,S,C]n = Qn,W ∈ Zf ,W =W
′) =


1, S′ = Zf \ {W
′},
0, otherwise.
(3)
Consider arbitrary W ′ ∈ [K] and S′ ⊂ [K] \ {W ′}, |S′|= M . Let f ′ ∈ [F ] be the (unique) index such
that Zf ′ = W
′ ∪ S′. It is easy to see that Pr(W = W ′,S = S′,W ∈ Zf |Q
[W,S,C]
n = Qn) = 0 for all
f ∈ [F ], f 6= f ′. Thus, by using (1)-(3), we can write
Pr(W = W ′,S = S′|Q[W,S,C]n = Qn)
=
∑
f∈[F ]
Pr(W = W ′,S = S′,W ∈ Zf |Q
[W,S,C]
n = Qn)
= Pr(W = W ′,S = S′,W ∈ Zf ′ |Q
[W,S,C]
n = Qn)
= Pr(W ∈ Zf ′ |Q
[W,S,C]
n = Qn)× Pr(W = W
′|Q[W,S,C]n = Qn,W ∈ Zf ′)
× Pr(S = S′|Q[W,S,C]n = Qn,W ∈ Zf ′ ,W =W
′)
=
1(
K
M+1
) × 1
M + 1
× 1
=
M ! (K −M − 1)!
K!
(4)
On the other hand, we have
Pr(W = W ′,S = S′)
= Pr(W = W ′)× Pr(S = S′|W =W ′)
=
1
K
×
1(
K−1
M
)
=
M ! (K −M − 1)!
K!
. (5)
From (4) and (5), for any W ′ ∈ [K] and S′ ⊂ [K] \ {W ′}, |S′|= M , we have
Pr(W = W ′,S = S′|Q[W,S,C]n = Qn) = Pr(W = W
′,S = S′).
This completes the proof of (W,S)-privacy of the proposed protocol.
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V. THE PIR-PCSI-II PROBLEM
In this section, we prove the result of Theorem 2 by constructing a PIR-PCSI–II protocol, referred to
as the Multi-Server PIR-PCSI–II protocol, for arbitrary N , K ≥ 2 and 2 ≤M ≤ K that achieves the rate(
1 + 1/N + · · ·+ 1/NK−M
)−1
.
For the proposed protocol, we assume that q ≥ K , and each message is comprised of m = N(
K
M) symbols
over Fq.
Multi-Server PIR-CSI–II protocol: The protocol consists of four steps, where the steps 2-4 are the same
as the steps 2-4 in the Multi-Server PIR-PCSI–I protocol, except that M is replaced with M − 1 everywhere.
The step 1 of the proposed protocol is as follows:
Step 1: The user utilizes the Modified Specialized GRS Code protocol proposed in [12] to first construct
a polynomial p(x) =
∑K−M
i=0 pix
i ,
∏
i6∈S(x− ωi) where ω1, . . . , ωK are K arbitrarily chosen distinct el-
ements from Fq , and then construct r , K − M + 1 vectors u1, . . . , ur, each of length K , such that
ui = [β1ω
i−1
1 , . . . , βKω
i−1
K ] for i ∈ [r], where βj =
cj
p(ωj)
for j ∈ S \W , βW =
c
p(ωW )
where c is chosen
uniformly at random from F×q \ {cW }, and βj is a randomly chosen element from F
×
q for j 6∈ S.
Lemma 2. The Multi-Server PIR-PCSI–II protocol satisfies the recoverability and (W,S)-privacy conditions,
and achieves the rate
(
1 + 1/N + · · ·+ 1/NK−M
)−1
.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1, and hence omitted to avoid repetition.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the multi-server setting of the Private Information Retrieval with Private Coded
Side Information (PIR-PCSI) problem. In this problem, there is a database of K messages replicated across N
servers, and there is a user who initially has a random linear combination of a random subset of M messages
in the database as side information. The goal of the user is to retrieve one message from the servers, while
protecting the identities of both the demand message and the side information messages jointly. We considered
two different models for this problem depending on whether the side information is a function of the demand
message or not. First, we focused on the setting in which the side information is not a function of the demand
message. For this setting, we proved that the capacity is given by
(
1 + 1/N + · · ·+ 1/NK−M−1
)−1
. Then,
we considered the setting in which the side information is a function of the demand message. For this setting,
we show that the capacity is lower-bounded by
(
1 + 1/N + · · ·+ 1/NK−M
)−1
. Our proposed achievability
schemes are inspired by our recently proposed scheme for the single-server PIR-PCSI problem in conjunction
with the scheme proposed by Sun and Jafar for multi-server private computation problem.
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